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UNITY IN DIVERSITY: EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE 
LENS OF POPULAR CULTURE 
 
Carl F. Stychin* 
 
Citizenship plays a central role within the political, legal and 
academic discourse of the European Union. It has been 
instrumental in attempting to foster a European identity across 
national boundaries, and it is a useful heuristic device for 
analyzing wider issues of membership and belonging. 
Citizenship theory also has been developed using examples 
drawn from popular culture. This article seeks to build upon this 
approach and enrich our understanding of European citizenship 
by interrogating one important annual European cultural event: 
the Eurovision Song Contest. The Contest, like Europe itself, 
illuminates a central tension between identity and difference, 
which demands scepticism towards grand narratives of an 
inevitably exclusionary European identity and destiny. 
 
La citoyenneté joue un rôle clé dans le discours politique, 
juridique et universitaire de l’Union européenne. La citoyenneté 
a joué un rôle de premier plan lorsqu’il s’est agi de cultiver une 
identité européenne par-delà les frontières nationales, et elle 
représente un moyen heuristique utile pour analyser des 
questions plus larges comme l’affiliation et l’appartenance. La 
théorie de la citoyenneté s’est également élaborée au moyen 
d’exemples tirés de la culture populaire. Cet article cherche à 
s’inspirer de cette approche et à faciliter notre compréhension 
de la citoyenneté européenne en examinant un événement 
culturel européen annuel important : le Concours Eurovision de 
la chanson. Le Concours, comme l’Europe elle-même, met en 
lumière une tension fondamentale entre identité et différence, ce 
qui exige d’accueillir avec scepticisme les métarécits d’une 





Although citizenship as a legal and political status – constituting a set of rights and 
responsibilities by which the individual is connected to the nation state – is hardly 
a new construct, it has only a relatively short history in the specific context of the 
project of European integration. In this same period, the concept of citizenship has 
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enjoyed a renewed interest across a range of academic disciplines for its 
explanatory potential. In fact, citizenship has been deployed in a staggeringly 
disparate assortment of ways in order to illuminate the complex connections 
between individuals, groups, and political communities, encompassing “collective 
identity, privileges of political membership, and social rights and claims.”1 This 
article can be located within that tradition. My aim is to utilize citizenship as 
shorthand for illustrating the paradoxes of “belonging” in Europe today. In so 
doing, I move from the legal meaning of European citizenship to broader, cultural 
understandings of what it means to belong – to be a citizen – in this transnational 
environment. Thus, I am interested both in “citizenship as a formal status in the 
law and as a substantive category of belonging.”2 I hope to refute the claim that 
citizenship has now exhausted its explanatory potential as a heuristic device by 
demonstrating that it still provides a useful means by which to demonstrate the 
complexities of “participation in public life and identity formation.”3 
 Citizenship has come to stand for a generalized and sometimes ill-defined 
measure of whether and how we are brought within the wider communities of 
which we claim membership. Indeed, it is central to our daily lexicon, embracing 
not only rights, but also our responsibilities to the polity.4 For example, the 
importance of “good citizenship” is a frequently recited trope which can be 
inculcated through citizenship education, both for those who aspire to membership 
in the national community and for those who find themselves attached to the 
nation state by accident of birth. Citizenship education in itself is interesting 
because it underscores the lack of consensus as to the substantive content of what 
it means to be a successful citizen.5 
 Citizenship is never ideologically neutral. The question of who gets to enjoy 
the privileges of membership, and how many of them,6 as well as the content of 
the basket of rights and responsibilities, will always be profoundly political.7 For 
example, many feminist theorists have demonstrated the ways in which citizenship 
has centred on a public sphere from which the category “woman” was historically 
excluded, and have shown how the public/private dichotomy has been a central 
                                                          
1
  Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002) at 162. See 
also Audrey Macklin, “Who is Citizen’s Other? Considering the Heft of Citizenship” (2007) 8:2 
Theor Inq L 333 at 334: “Citizenship as an analytic category is remarkably capacious, as if self-
consciously resisting the exclusionary impulses that horizontal practices of citizenship cannot”; 
and Gerald Delanty & Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of 
Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005) at 4: “[t]he concept of citizenship has been over-
worked as a sociologically useful term”. 
2
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Quarterly 659 at 671. 
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4
  David Scobey, “The Specter of Citizenship” (2001) 5:1 Citizenship Studies 11. 
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Geographers 387. The subject of this article, the Eurovision Song Contest, has itself been used as 
the basis of a lesson plan for citizenship education in schools: “Eurovision Cross-curricular 
Project”, online: Times Education Supplement <http://www.t-e-s.co.uk/article.aspx?story-
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6
  What Audrey Macklin calls the “heft” of citizenship: Macklin, supra  note 1. 
7
  See e.g. Cris Shore, Building Europe: The Cultural Politics of European Integration (London: 
Routledge, 2000) at 71, wherein citizenship is described as “an ideological construct”. 
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regulatory device in citizenship discourse.8 Furthermore, it has been argued that 
citizenship is not only a means to embrace the individual into the community and 
grant privileges of membership, it is equally a means to assimilate and to 
“normalize” into responsibility and self-discipline.9 At the same time, individuals 
and groups are not passive vessels in a process of normalization. We also shape, 
challenge and resist dominant assumptions about what makes the “good citizen.”10 
 In this article, my aim is to explore these themes and I do so through the lens 
of popular culture. Although this may appear at first to be an unusual disciplinary 
border crossing into the terrain of citizenship, the connections between popular 
culture and political community are increasingly made.11 I investigate this nexus 
through a particular popular cultural event – the Eurovision Song Contest [ESC] – 
in order to illustrate some of the paradoxes of European citizenship.12 My 
argument is that the ESC foregrounds an irresolvable tension between identity and 
difference that pervades the attempt at developing a post-national form of 
belonging in Europe. This is evident in political communities more widely, but it 
is thrown into particularly sharp relief in the novel context of the European 
transnational entity. 
 
II. THE POST/NATIONAL CITIZEN OF THE UNION 
 
 Various facets (and faces) of citizenship come together in the unique 
circumstances of the European Union. First, citizenship is a legal construct in EU 
law, which came into being through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992.13 The current 
formulation in Article 20 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
states that:  
 
1. Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person 
holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen 
of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to 
and not replace national citizenship.  
2. Citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights and be subject to 
the duties provided for in the Treaties.14 
 
Explicitly, European citizenship is an “add-on” and is dependent upon national 
citizenship. Its scope, in legal terms, appears very limited, including inter alia: 
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a) the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States; 
b) the right to vote in local and European elections in the host 
state and stand as a candidate; 
c) the right to diplomatic and consular protection from the 
authorities of any Member State in third countries; 
d) the right to petition the European Parliament and the right to 
apply to the ombudsman and to address the institutions and 
advisory bodies of the Union in any of the official 
languages of the EU.15  
 
 Historically, citizenship of the Union has been associated with the exercise of 
rights, rather than with citizenship participation or responsibilities.16 This has given 
rise to its description as a passive form of citizenship.17 Moreover, the overriding 
right of European citizenship clearly has been free movement of persons (and 
“workers” in particular), although the content of this right has been interpreted so 
as to uphold basic human rights (particularly the right to “family life” in the 
European Convention on Human Rights18).19 This is because the scope of 
citizenship rights has expanded to include the Charter of Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union,20 and today we find European citizens’ rights “scattered 
across primary and secondary sources.”21  
 Originally, the right to free movement was justified in terms of an unimpeded 
free market (which also was the rationale for EU sex discrimination law).22 Thus, it 
has been commonplace to describe citizenship of the Union as primarily a form of 
“market citizenship”,23 in that it has prioritized and privileged “the role of the 
economically active in the free movement of workers and only giv[es] secondary 
free movement rights to the non-economically active.”24 An important limitation 
on EU citizenship rights concerns “third country nationals” resident within the EU, 
who did not possess free movement rights (although this has now altered to some 
extent in the case of third country nationals who are long term residents).25 Those 
                                                          
15
  Ibid. 
16
  Kenneth Armstrong, “Legal Integration: Theorizing the Legal Dimension of European 
Integration” (1998) 36:2 Journal of Common Market Studies 154. 
17
  Gianluigi Palombella, “Whose Europe? After the Constitution: A Goal-Based Citizenship” (2005) 
3:2-3 International Journal of Constitutional Law 357 at 362. 
18
  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 
213 UNTS 221, Eur TS 5. 
19
  Flora Goudappel, The Effects of EU Citizenship (The Hague: T M C Asser Press, 2010) at 30. 
20
  EU, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, [2000] OJ C 364/01. 
21
  Catherine Barnard, The Substantive Law of the EU, 3d ed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010) at 421. 
22
  Goudappel, supra note 19 at 30. 
23
  Michelle Everson, “The Legacy of the Market Citizen” in Jo Shaw & Gillian More, eds, New 
Legal Dynamics of European Union (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995) 73. 
24
  Goudappel, supra note 19 at 31. 
25
  Ibid at 33. 
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married to nationals have only secondary citizenship rights.26 Finally, an “in-
between category of citizens” has been created in order to grant only limited rights 
to citizens of the accession states of Eastern Europe during a period of transition.27 
In sum, we find today “multiple categories of citizens, all with a different set of 
rights and duties.”28 But what remains clear is who sits at the top of the citizenship 
apex, namely, the “cross-border worker.”29 In these ways, the tension between 
freedom of movement within the EU, and the linking of rights to territorial notions 
of membership, creates a situation in which “the EU is caught in contradictory 
currents that move it toward norms of cosmopolitan justice in the treatment of 
those who are within its boundaries, while leading it to act in accordance with 
outmoded Westphalian conceptions of sovereignty toward those who are on the 
outside.”30 This tension between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian will be 
central to my argument in this article.31  
 While much critical attention has been paid to the way in which European 
citizenship privileges the economically active migrant, it must be noted that the 
legal construct of citizenship did not create mobility rights ab initio. Instead, it 
“rebranded” rights under the sign of European citizenship. The rationale was very 
clear. It was explicitly intended to create “a category of subjectivity”32 – the 
European citizen – in order to foster and encourage a sense of belonging to the 
European Union: “European citizenship was going to help construct a European 
demos and to elicit subjective identification with the EU.”33 The individual, it was 
hoped, would be connected to this transnational collective entity, giving rise to 
loyalty and identity “to create a community of people rather than simply a free 
market area.”34 Yet, at the same time, the derivative character of EU citizenship 
problematically “subjects membership to the European public to the definitions, 
terms and conditions of membership prevailing in national politics.”35 European 
citizenship thus was intended to provide a “political technology” designed “to 
                                                          
26
  Ibid. 
27
  Ibid. 
28
  Ibid. 
29
  Ibid at 34. 
30
  Seyla Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) at 47. 
31
  See generally Richard Bellamy & Dario Castiglione, “The Communitarian Ghost in the 
Cosmopolitan Machine: Constitutionalism, Democracy and the Reconfiguration of Politics in the 
New Europe” in Richard Bellamy, ed, Constitutionalism, Democracy and Sovereignty: American 
and European Perspectives (Aldershot: Averbury, 1996) 111.  
32
  Shore, supra note 7 at 30. 
33
  Dora Kostakopoulou, “European Union Citizenship: Writing the Future” (2007) 13:5 Eur LJ 623 
at 625. 
34
  Willem Maas, Creating European Citizens (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007) at 7. 
35
  Kostakopoulou, supra note 33 at 626. See also Paul Magnette, “How can one be European? 
Reflections on the Pillars of European Civic Identity” (2007) 13:5 Eur LJ 664 at 678: “Studies in 
social psychology show a strong correlation between identification with Europe and xenophobia. 
It is also probable that the more identity is forged through opposition, the more potential for 
exclusion it carries. If these hypotheses were to be validated, the paradox of the identification 
with the Union would be the decline in tolerance for non-Europeans, including those within the 
EU.”  
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shape the way individuals perceive and conduct themselves.”36 My interest, 
however, is neither to critique nor to celebrate the legal limitations or potential of 
EU citizenship discourse. Instead, I want to explore citizenship in a broader sense, 
as signifying more general issues concerning identity, belonging, and membership 
of political communities which exist at different geographical and political scales 
in Europe.  
 At the heart of this study, I argue that there lies an apparent contradiction in 
how citizenship is conceived in the EU, which is relevant to other polities as well. 
On the one hand, policy makers and academics sympathetic to the European 
project have attempted to construct and to justify a common European identity in 
terms of a shared culture, by which I mean the historical reservoir of knowledge 
and values of society. This acts like a tarpaulin placed over the cultural and 
historical diversity between and within nation states, which is coterminous with an 
imagined entity called “Europe.” In this moment, the EU “legitimates itself 
through the nationalistic pretence of common culture in precisely the same way as 
its constituent nation states.”37 Tradition becomes selectively “reclaimed” (or 
invented) as a unifying force which can then act as a rationale for the inclusion of 
new citizens and the exclusion of those who are not (and might never be) 
essentially European.38 Claims to a common culture thus are made in order to bind 
Europeans together while, simultaneously, that culture is assumed to be always 
already embedded in the “collective conscience of its peoples.”39 
 This approach to citizenship has been apparent in some official EU 
publications in the past which refer to the promotion of a European culture.40 As 
Tawhida Ahmed and Tamara Hervey argue, the European Commission has 
primarily funded cultural projects based upon a “traditional” notion of culture 
through which minority cultures have been largely excluded.41 Citizenship 
becomes inextricably linked to a shared culture and a common cultural tradition 
which is produced through a selecting of elements which can then be knitted 
together. In this moment, citizenship is grounded in culture, but it is a culture 
particularly shaped by reason and modernity.42 This is a citizenship which 
apparently arises out of the Enlightenment, leaving those not so positioned 
burdened by “excessive and archaic” culture and therefore not easily (or perhaps 
ever) capable of assimilation into being “Europeans.”43 
                                                          
36
  Shore, supra note 7 at 30. The invention of citizenship is closely related to the desire to enhance 
the ideological strength of the institutions of contemporary European governance.  
37
  Ian Ward, “Identifying the European Other” (2002) 14:2-3 Int’l J Refugee L 219 at 226. 
38
  Nick Barber, “Citizenship, Nationalism and the European Union” (2002) 27:3 Eur L Rev 241 at 
252. 
39
  Shore, supra note 7 at 52. 
40
  See Rachel Crauford Smith, “From Heritage Conservation to European Identity: Article 151 EC 
and the Multi-faceted Nature of Community Cultural Policy” (2007) 27:1 Eur L Rev 48. Article 
151 EC is the current Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  
41
  Tawhida Ahmed & Tamara Hervey, “The European Union and Cultural Diversity: A Missed 
Opportunity?” (2003-2004) 3 European Yearbook of Minority Issues 43.  
42
  Franz Mayer & Jan Palmowski, “European Identities and the EU – The Ties that Bind the Peoples 
of Europe” (2004) 42:3 Journal of Common Market Studies 573. 
43
  Leti Volpp, “The Culture of Citizenship” (2007) 8:2 Theor Inq L 571 at 574. Guibernau suggests 
that this is a Europe “defined by capitalism, social welfare, liberal democracy, respect for human 
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 This imagining of citizenship through a shared identity has not gone 
uncontested. It has been argued forcefully that, as a descriptive and a normative 
matter, we cannot understand European citizenship through such a nation based 
and exclusionary model of identity (problematic even at the level of the nation 
state) writ large.44 Instead, the opportunity can and should be taken to approach 
this novel citizenship form in a radical fashion. In this interpretation, an alternative 
imagining of citizenship is articulated which does not depend on the singularity of 
identity and claims of being a European “people” in unity. Instead, post-national 
citizenship has been associated with “a cosmopolitan orientation”,45 and has been 
characterized by Jo Shaw as “an open-textured concept”46 with “a lack of 
anchorage”,47 “where the very social basis of the polity remains highly contested 
and very fluid.”48 In this way, European citizenship could “change our 
understanding of community.”49 It can “make the boundaries of membership more 
open and flexible”,50 leading to “a Europe which is self-critically experimental.”51  
 For example, Dora Kostakopolou argues that this reorientation would focus on 
difference (rather than identity), inclusivity, networks, and “a genuinely 
heterogeneous European public.”52 Instead of attempting to reclaim (or invent) a 
common shared European identity, sameness is rejected in favour of a form of 
pluralism in which there is no single “people” of Europe. There may be direct 
political connection through institutions to individuals, but this is a form of post-
national thinking which does not rely upon a single European public sphere and 
political life.53 Instead, it “requires informed curiosity about the political lives of 
our neighbours and mechanisms for our voices to be heard in each other’s 
forums.”54 Claims to a common identity are refuted, for example, by the 
observation that, although “Europe can be distinguished by a common historical 
experience”,55 the interpretation of that experience is deeply divisive because of 
sharply “divergent historical memories.”56 In fact, the European Economic 
                                                                                                                                     
rights, freedom and the rule of law, prosperity and progress”: Montserrat Guibernau, The Identity 
of Nations (Cambridge: Polity, 2007) at 115-116. 
44
  See e.g. Dora Kostakopoulou, “Thick, Thin and Thinner Patriotisms: Is This All There Is?” 
(2006) 26:1 Oxford J Legal Stud 73; Kalypso Nicolaidis, “The New Constitution as European 
‘Demoi-cracy’?” (2004) 7:1 Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 76; 
Michael Lister and Emily Pia, Citizenship in Contemporary Europe (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2008); Ward, supra  note 37.  
45
  Kostakopoulou, supra note 33 at 630. 
46
  Jo Shaw, “Postnational Constitutionalism in the European Union” (1999) 6:4 Journal of European 
Public Policy 579 at 589. 
47
  Ibid at 585. 
48
  Ibid at 586. 
49
  Kostakopoulou, supra note 33 at 628. 
50
  Ibid. 
51
  Ulrich Beck, Cosmopolitan Vision, translated by Ciaran Cronin (Cambridge: Polity, 2006) at 171. 
52
  Kostakopoulou, supra note 33 at 643. 
53
  Philip Schlesinger, “Media and Belonging: The Changing Shape of Political Communication in 
the European Union” in Ulf Hedetoft & Mette Hjort, eds, The Postnational Self: Belonging and 
Identity (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002) 35 at 42. 
54
  Nicolaidis, supra  note 44 at 84. 
55
  Mayer & Palmowski, supra note 42 at 581. 
56
  Ibid. 
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Community was itself “an institutional creation necessitated precisely by the lack 
of a positive identity.”57 When attempts have been made by academics, and EU 
politicians and bureaucrats, to claim some kind of identity based on a shared 
culture, these attempts generally lead (as they do in other political contexts) to 
exclusion and division. 
 My argument is that these two visions produce a constitutive tension within 
our understanding of European citizenship between identity and difference. In 
some moments, EU institutions have emphasized a common heritage and ancestry 
(drawing, for example, on Christianity, classical civilization or the 
Enlightenment),58 but in other moments, the EU turns towards “heterogeneity and 
multiplicity.”59 Currently, for example, “Brussels has identified its cultural agenda 
as the preservation of Europe’s diversity.”60 Indeed, the slogan “unity in diversity” 
has become a motto of the European Union, underlining the paradox of asserting 
both identity and difference.61 This is the challenge,62 but also the potential, of a 
post-national form of citizenship, which illustrates a more general proposition that 
there is no original, “pure” culture, and that cultural traditions are always 
“changeable, renegotiated and reconstructed creations shaped by external 
influences, internal reflections, struggles and collisions.”63 
 This post-national complexity manifests itself in everything from Euro bank 
notes to buildings. On the former, we find “nothing but emptiness: bridges with 
empty arches, empty doorways, and empty windows.”64 On the latter, “the 
buildings of the EU’s institutions have been inspired by forward-looking 
modernism.”65 In this moment, “rationality and enlightenment” become the 
universal tradition that is drawn upon, in which “much of what is now being called 
European is devoid of memory.”66 But this in itself is problematic as reason comes 
to signify that which is specifically European and thereby reproduces the historic 
                                                          
57
  Ibid at 580. 
58
  Shore, supra note 7 at 54-63. 
59
  Mayer & Palmowski, supra note 42 at 582. 
60
  Ibid. 
61
  Shore, supra note 7 at 54. On the paradox of the slogan, See e.g.Michel Rosenfeld, The Identity of 
the Constitutional Subject (New York: Routledge, 2010) at 176: “Either the European peoples are 
already united in their diversity, in which case it is difficult to understand why their constitutional 
project is so problematic; or, the unity in question is a hope for the future, but rings hollow as 
nothing has occurred thus far suggests how this abstract aspiration may be transformed into a 
concrete process of adaptation”.  
62
  A challenge, in part, because “it hardly affords any further ground for common identification, 
especially since it describes the Union as an end in itself, instead of connecting with the ethical 
convictions of Union citizens”: Armin von Bogdandy, “The European Constitution and European 
Identity: Text and Subtext of the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe” (2005) 3:2-3 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 295 at 310. 
63
  Kostakopoulou, supra note 44 at 90. 
64
  Emil Tode, “Europe, a Blot of Ink” in Ursula Keller & Ilma Rakusa, eds, Writing Europe 
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004) 301 at 307. 
65
  Mayer and Palmowski, supra  note 42 at 581. 
66
  Delanty and Rumford, supra note 1 at 99. 
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exclusion of the non-European from the realm of reason and civilization into the 
sphere of barbarism, savagery and weighed down by the burdens of culture.67  
 In legal terms, Article 167 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union encapsulates this tension within the text of the fundamental European law 
itself.68 It both empowers the EU to bring Europe’s “common cultural heritage to 
the fore”, while also stressing the importance of “national and regional diversity.” 
As Nick Barber has argued, the phrase “common cultural heritage” has proven to 
be a peg on which the EU has attempted to hang contested conceptions of a 
European cultural citizenship which unite the peoples of Europe.69 This is 
“presented as the inheritance of the European people”,70 “a product of their history 
and experiences”71 and “a boundary marker.”72 Critically, Barber observes that 
“true Europeans can be identified by virtue of their inculcation into these cultural 
experiences” which, of course, simultaneously provides the means for exclusion of 
the inauthentic (non) European (which has proven particularly relevant in the 
context of ongoing discussions about EU expansion to Turkey).73  
 But Article 167 also contains within it the seeds of cultural difference by 
stressing the importance of diversity. Rachel Crauford Smith argues that Article 
167, on the one hand, facilitates “conserving that which is deemed valuable from 
the past for future generations”,74 yet “no attempt is made to define the term 
                                                          
67
  See generally Peter Fitzpatrick, “New Europe and Old Stories: Mythology and Legality in the 
European Union” in Peter Fitzpatrick & James Bergeron, eds, Europe’s Other: European Law 
Between Modernity and Postmodernity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998) 27. 
68
  The relevant provisions of Article 167 are:  
1. The Union shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member 
States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the 
same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore.  
2. Action by the Community shall be aimed at encouraging cooperation 
between Member States and, if necessary, supporting and supplementing 
their action in the following areas: 
- improvement of the knowledge and dissemination of 
the culture and history of the European peoples, 
- conservation and safeguarding of cultural heritage of 
European significance, 
- non-commercial cultural exchanges, 
- artistic and literary creation, including in the 
audiovisual sector. 
3. The Union and the Member States shall foster cooperation with third 
countries and the competent international organisations in the sphere of 
culture, in particular the Council of Europe. 
4. The Union shall take cultural aspects into account in its action under other 
provisions of the Treaties, in particular in order to respect and to promote 
the diversity of its cultures.  
 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 13 December 
2007, [2008] OJ C 115/1.  
69
  Barber, supra note 38 at 255-256. 
70
  Ibid at 256.  
71
  Ibid. 
72
  Ibid. 
73
  Ibid. As illustrated by the comment of President Sarkozy of France that “Turkey does not have a 
place in the European Union because it’s not a European country” (quoted in Julian Clark & Alun 
Jones, “The Spatialities of Europeanisation: Territory, Government and Power in ‘EUrope’” 
(2008) 33:3 Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 300 at 313). 
74
 Crauford Smith, supra  note 40 at 50. 
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‘culture’”,75 which is assumed to combine universal (read European) values as well 
as specific national identities. What Crauford Smith does identify, however, in her 
review of recent EU policy documentation, is “the way in which cultural policy is 
now explicitly linked to the concept of European citizenship, thereby giving it a 
pronounced political and instrumental spin.”76 The focus is on enhancing mutual 
understanding, commonality, networks, as well as promoting the common cultural 
heritage.  
 Thus, cultural policy has come to reproduce the identity/difference conundrum. 
The stress on networks, exchanges and collaboration allows for a European (non) 
identity which rests on the diversity of members without having to define any 
essential substantive content. But, simultaneously, claims are made to a common 
European culture which takes on a universal resonance, and which acts as a marker 
of Western civilization itself, which becomes both universal as well as specifically 
European.77 This is the central problem of identity and difference in the imagining 
of citizenship: “a dynamic blend that remains in tension in function of the ongoing 
dialectical confrontation between the universal and the particular.”78  
 The “unity in diversity” motto – “a deliberately ambiguous and ideologically 
loaded formula”79 – thus becomes a handy device by which to “paper over” the 
fault lines in an imagined European identity and culture. As Monica Sassatelli 
argues, “the European dimension is conceived as a mediating instance between the 
global scale and local allegiances.”80 That is, “Europe” must somehow manage to 
be neither universal nor particular.81 It cannot be genuinely universal because then 
there is nothing distinctly European about it.82 Thus, “a shared European identity 
means differentiating Europeans from others and solidifying a particularistic 
collective identity.”83 Nor can it claim to be entirely particular because that would 
replicate the national on a larger stage, and force Europe to come up with an 
inevitably contested historical narrative and essence that fail to unite. As a 
consequence, it becomes neither fully cosmopolitan nor entirely communitarian.84 
Rather, it is:  
 
[C]aught in the contradictory situation of having to define a 
common European culture that is universal – but not so universal 
that it is global and thus not distinctively European – and at the 
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same time does not negate national and regional cultures. On the 
one side, the condition of universality must be satisfied and, on 
the other, the principle of diversity must be upheld.85  
 
More cynically, “unity in diversity” has been described as a “saccharine 
concept”,86 signifying nothing except perhaps the ultimate postmodern entity.87 It is 
hardly surprising, then, that European Union cultural policy has been largely a 
“top-down” exercise, and has demonstrated few tangible successes in fostering the 
EU’s citizenship agenda.88  
 
III. MEMBERSHIP AS PERFORMANCE IN EUROPE 
 
We need to consider the fact that citizenship should also be 
understood as a performance: rules of behaviour, public actions, 
and self-understanding.89 
 
In the remainder of this article, I want to illustrate these abstract claims by 
exploring a particular example of popular culture in Europe today. I situate this 
approach to understanding citizenship at the intersection of political theory and 
cultural studies, an increasingly popular junction for academic analysis.90 My 
method follows Jodi Dean’s insight that the study of popular culture can “pluralize 
the political”,91 and rejects “the idea that politics must be centered in the state.”92 
Like Dean, I am interested in “the tensions and contradictions traversing cultural 
productions” which can rightly be labelled political.93 As well, legal scholars, such 
as Brenda Cossman, have demonstrated convincingly that citizenship can be 
productively framed “as including not only legal and political practices but also 
cultural practices and representations.”94 In this reading of citizenship, “it is about 
the way subjects are constituted as citizens and the way citizenship itself is 
constituted. It is about the discourses and practices of inclusion and exclusion, of 
belonging and otherness, and the many shades in between.”95 
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 The method I adopt also is indebted to the work of communication theorists 
Jean Burgess, Marcus Foth and Helen Klaebe, who favour a broader understanding 
of the public sphere of citizenship, so as to recognize that “popular culture and 
everyday life” are also “constitutive of cultural citizenship.”96 Popular culture has 
consequences for democracy, and it provides a “theoretical alternative to the 
rational public sphere”97, widely associated with Jürgen Habermas, with its focus 
on political and civic rights and responsibilities.98 According to Burgess, Foth and 
Klaebe, “bona fide citizenship is practised as much through everyday life, leisure, 
critical consumption and popular entertainment as it is through debate and 
engagement with capital ‘P’ politics.”99 In this regard, television provides one 
important site of cultural citizenship, both in terms of producing a common 
identity for diverse populations who share an experience, but also increasingly 
through the recognition of diversity and difference within an audience who may 
relate in a disparate and fragmented set of ways to the medium and to any 
particular representation.100 
 This cultural turn in citizenship studies, while not uncontroversial, can be 
justified in terms of how popular culture is an important means by which struggles 
over the representation of citizens play themselves out. Popular culture facilitates 
inclusion (and exclusion) and forms an integral part of the public sphere. It 
provides “a site of democratic explorations, translations and dialogue.”101 The way 
in which we are represented – and see ourselves in images – is important in terms 
of how we understand our place in the broader political landscape. It can reinforce 
dominant understandings, for example, of the family unit (a key vehicle by which 
the nation state has reproduced itself), or it can challenge and redefine, in a more 
inclusive way, how the family is imagined.102 Moreover, the impact of television 
certainly should not be underestimated. Ours is an era in which television provides 
the medium through which innumerable citizens experience direct democracy 
through televoting, while many of those same citizens claim to be disenfranchised 
by traditional political processes (and increasingly abstain from exercising their 
democratic rights).103 
                                                          
96
  Jean Burgess, Marcus Foth & Helen Klaebe, “Everyday Creativity as Civic Engagement: A 
Cultural Citizenship View of New Media” Proceedings: Communications Policy & Research 
Forum, online: Network Insight Institute <http://www.network insight.org/ verve 
/resources/Burgess-Foth-Klaebe.pdf> at 2. 
97
  Ibid at 1. 
98
  Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society, translated by Thomas Burger (Boston: MIT Press, 1991 [1962]). 
99
  Burgess, Foth & Klaebe, supra note 96 at 1. See also Lister & Pia, supra note 44 at 84, who argue 
that “the notion that there can be an essence of ‘the political’ is antipathetic to constructivist 
positions”. 
100
  John Hartley, “Democratainment” in Robert Allen & Annette Hill, eds, The Television Studies 
Reader (London: Routledge, 2004) 524 at 527. 
101
  Delanty & Rumford, supra  note 1 at 92. 
102
  Cossman, supra note 11 at 159-193. 
103
  Of course, it can be argued that this suggests an unhealthy state of politics; see Lister & Pia, supra  
note 44 at 80: “something, it seems, is wrong with democracy, if more people vote for candidates 
on reality television shows, than vote to decide who will govern the country”. 
 Vol. 29(1)  Unity in Diversity 13 
 
 While television may be understood as important to the creation and regulation 
of citizens, music is also relevant to my analysis.104 It is trite to say that music has 
played a historically central role in the construction of national identity, promoting 
“belonging” by the citizen to the polity:  
 
In a world where music and the politics of collective identity 
converge, it is the who, what, and why of performance that must 
be evaluated. To move beyond considerations of music as art 
and foreground its political uses is to admit another level of 
experience – a sphere where musical texts are as malleable as 
society itself.105   
 
This was certainly not lost on the politicians of the European Union, who 
recognized the “political uses” of music when they chose Beethoven’s Ode as an 
anthem of the EU.106 By extension, popular music also plays a role in the ongoing 
constitution of nations and citizens. It “serves as a central means of demarcating 
national borders [and] reinforces the imaginary cultural boundaries of the nation 
state”;107 although popular music has not figured prominently in official European 
Union discourse. 
 However, despite its absence from official policy, the conjunction of television 
and popular music has played a highly significant role in the post-war history of 
the European project broadly conceived. In this article, my interest is in one 
particular technology by which citizens are constituted, namely the Eurovision 
Song Contest [ESC]. The success of the ESC as an annual cultural event viewed 
and dissected by millions worldwide in itself makes it an obvious site of study.108 
But aside from the fact that it is so popular, the ESC is interesting because of the 
wide array of meanings which it appears to convey to an audience within and 
beyond Europe.109 My argument is that the ESC is an event which, in spectacular 
fashion, illuminates and troubles contemporary ideas of European culture, identity, 
and citizenship. Through the endless interpretations made by its mass audience, it 
underscores the close relationship between politics and popular culture. As Philip 
Bohlman argues, “as the votes are tallied, Europe is exercising a cultural 
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democracy more universal and grassroots in character than any of its election 
rituals.”110 
 The Contest has an extensive and illustrious history which provides 
voluminous data for analysis. It began in 1956 as a project of the European 
Broadcasting Union [EBU] and participation has always been open to any member 
country of the EBU.111 The EBU is not an agency of the European Union; rather it 
“is the world’s largest professional association of national public-service 
broadcasters” and was founded in 1950.112 Membership includes, for example, a 
number of North African and Middle Eastern countries. Thus, the borders of the 
competition have always been far broader than those of the European Union or its 
predecessors, the EEC and EC (whose political and cultural borders have 
themselves been subject to “reimagining” throughout history).113 
 Based loosely on the San Remo Song Festival, the ESC was explicitly 
designed as a means of developing European culture through the increasingly 
important medium of television. Intended as a popular cultural spectacle, the ESC 
was consciously imagined so as to inculcate cultural citizenship for a European 
audience.114 Broadcasters hoped that the spectacle might facilitate a form of 
transnational European community and solidarity through song. If measured solely 
in terms of audience numbers and the engagement of the viewing public 
(particularly in more recent times through televoting), the ESC has proven a great 
success as a citizenship tool, providing one Saturday evening shared across 
national boundaries within and beyond the European Union.115 The fact that 
participation in the ESC has extended so widely – today encompassing Israel, 
Turkey, and Russia – reinforces the idea that “Europe” is a political construction 
with highly permeable and indeterminate boundaries.116 In addition, the ESC has 
often foreshadowed developments in political union: “Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania joined the ESC a decade before they were 
allowed to join the EU, predicting Europe’s gradual expansion towards the 
East.”117 The same, of course, could be said for the United Kingdom, which was 
one of the original members of the ESC, long before it joined the EEC. The ESC 
provides a (literal) stage for the performance of the nation state for an international 
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audience but, simultaneously, it is a vehicle for the transcending of the nation state 
because of the goal of appealing to a public (and garnering votes) beyond national 
borders. As Göran Bolin argues, it “has become a discursive tool in the definitions 
of Europeanness and political strategies of Europeanization.”118  
 In a sense, all are equal citizens in the Contest in that each country has three 
minutes in which to perform, and the order of performance is randomly 
determined. Voting by television viewers occurs on a national basis immediately 
after all of the performances, and the votes of the public are then combined with 
those of national expert juries.119 Every EBU member country has an equal right to 
apply for entry into the competition (which is made up of two semi-finals as well 
as the grand finale). Outcomes are supposedly based upon “artistic merit” as each 
participating country ranks all of the songs (except its own). The ESC is governed 
by a lengthy and complex rule book designed to ensure free and fair competition.120  
 However, this emphasis on fairness can also be understood as a formal equality 
of citizens which hides an underlying substantive inequality between nation states. 
Four nation states – UK, France, Germany, Spain – each receive an automatic 
“bye” through to the finals based upon the annual funding they provide to the 
Contest (thereby avoiding the very real possibility of elimination at the semi-final 
stage).121 Furthermore, economic disparities are readily apparent on Eurovision 
night, as some entries clearly are better funded than others, giving rise to apparent 
inequalities in production values, costumes, and special effects.122 However, this 
unequal starting position is tempered by the fact that, for those less wealthy 
countries for whom the Eurovision stage may represent an opportunity and an 
aspiration to display nationhood to an audience largely ignorant of their identity 
(and who may aspire to membership of the European Union), the three minutes of 
fame is often taken very seriously as a chance to demonstrate the worthiness of 
their aspirations. As a consequence, the financial investment by the competing 
country and earnestness of performance may be significantly greater than that seen 
emanating from the political “centre” of Europe. 
 But while Eurovision provides an unrivalled opportunity to perform 
nationhood on an international stage, it has long embodied a complex relationship 
to the forces of globalization and transnationalism, and it illustrates the tension 
between sameness and difference.123 The ESC frequently has witnessed a 
combination of the performance of ethnicity (difference) and universality 
(sameness) simultaneously, in which “specific markers of national style might be 
woven into a song texture that is otherwise global.”124 Indeed, this now seems to be 
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a common recipe for Eurovision success. That is, the chances of appealing to a 
diverse international voting public increasingly seem to be dependent upon a 
performance which is read as culturally authentic, “exotic” and novel, but which 
is, nevertheless, readily consumable without too much obscurity or intellectual 
effort required. In this way, the ESC becomes a showcase for a form of 
“representational multiculturalism” in which citizenship is displayed for, and 
consumed by, an international audience of fellow citizens.125 Diverse national 
cultures become something non-threatening and entertaining, and difference is 
sufficiently assimilated to be readily comprehensible and not essentially very 
different at all.126 
 Furthermore, the choice of language has been frequently cited as an important 
element of Eurovision success. In this regard, the rules of the ESC have been 
subject to frequent changes. Whether an entry is restricted to an official language 
of the entry country, or whether there is freedom to sing in any language, has 
altered on several occasions, most recently in 1999, when restrictions were 
lifted.127 The rules now allow participating countries to choose the English 
language (a perceived universal medium) which, many believe, greatly enhances 
the chances of success (although this may also be changing to some extent given 
the expansion of the contest eastward, leading to a decline in the hegemony of 
English). Through the years, though, participating countries have managed on a 
number of occasions to circumvent the particularizing force of language 
restrictions in order to appeal to a mass audience. This includes the use of 
nonsensical, invented languages, or familiar refrains.128 In sum, Eurovision, like 
the EU, inhabits a tension between a common identity and cultural difference. It 
can be neither truly globalized nor entirely localized, and it inevitably straddles the 
boundary between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism.  
 Consequently, many songs of the ESC have been strongly influenced by the 
forces of cultural particularity through the inclusion of “indigenous” or “ethnic” 
musical styles.129 Of course, the construction of music as traditional is itself a tool 
of nationalist discourse and “the attainment of a sense of historical cultural roots is 
sought by means of an active construction of the past rather than historical 
accuracy.”130 Nevertheless, it is a frequently cited and highly successful 
phenomenon that has become widespread in recent contests. More accurately, it 
might be said that the ESC voters have rewarded some songs which combine both 
particularizing and universalizing currents. This can be seen as a highly creative 
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means to appeal to a transnational audience. It also can stand as a metaphor for 
wider political developments in the European Union.  
 A leading example of the success of this strategy is in Turkey’s winning song, 
Everyway that I can, of 2003.131 So called “ethnic music” was combined with 
English lyrics and pop music. According to Thomas Solomon, the success of the 
entry lay in the fact that it deployed “the exotic Turkish elements”132 – such as 
belly dancing – “within an overall hybrid style, and seems to be intended not so 
much for consumption in Turkey, but for distribution, promotion and consumption 
outside Turkey.”133 Similarly, Matthew Gumpert has described this approach as 
“Auto-Orientalist”,134 in that “ethnicity” is made “slightly and safely exotic”135 and 
cultural difference becomes “just another performance designed for the West.”136 
The symbolic significance of the victory cannot be underestimated, and was 
“widely seen in Turkey as an allegory of its aspirations to join the European Union 
and its frustratingly slow movement toward that goal.”137 It may provide a useful 
lesson for those working towards EU membership in Turkey. Success in the 
political realm may depend upon the domesticating of difference, such that the 
“other” is viewed as assimilable into the hegemonic values and institutions of the 
EU. In this reading, both the ESC and the struggle for EU membership become an 
ongoing performance by which the “other” must demonstrate that difference, if not 
transcended, can at least be contained and domesticated in such a way that it is 
non-threatening. Rather, it becomes just another harmless cultural variation under 
the sign of “Europe.” As Leti Volpp suggests, “in order to be assimilated into 
citizenship, the cultural other needs to shed his excessive and archaic culture”, 
leaving only that which can be safely absorbed.138  
 A similar recipe for Eurovision success can be found in the 2004 winning 
performance by Ukraine’s Ruslana in her rendition of Wild Dances.139 Here it is 
worth noting that Ukraine has increasingly strong links with the European Union 
and a stated desire for membership.140 It is a priority partner within the European 
Neighbourhood Policy141 and is currently negotiating an association agreement, 
“which includes a free-trade agreement and the possibility of visa-free travel” 
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within the EU.142 It is certainly well within the penumbra of the EU’s sphere of 
influence and subject to increasing regulation from the centre.143 Wild Dances can 
be interpreted as a complex mixture of elements drawn from Carpathian 
indigeneity combined with a “contemporary musical and showbiz idiom.”144 In the 
performance, Ruslana both identifies as wild and savage-like (the non-European 
“other”), but also refutes these stereotypes through an embrace of the 
Enlightenment tradition of autonomy (and, moreover, female autonomy in this 
case).145 The use of both Ukrainian and English lyrics “functions as a 
demonstration of the singer’s loyalty to her native language, on the one hand, and 
of global cultural competence on the other.”146 The costumes both reference 
“primordial native cultural sources”147 (real or invented for the occasion) but also 
“signalled participation in one of the most widespread practices of contemporary 
global popular culture: the sexualisation of cultural products in the interests of 
enhancing their market appeal.”148 It is this mixture of the strangely different and 
the universally familiar which seemed to catch the imagination of Eurovision 
voters.   
 In terms of Eurovision as citizenship, Ruslana provides a perfect example of 
the aspiration to European membership, as she performed the possibility of “the 
participation of Ukraine in Europe.”149 She suggests through Wild Dances that 
there is no necessary contradiction between the assertion of identity and 
participation in the transnational community. Indeed, as Marko Pavlyshyn 
concludes, “participation in the Eurovision contest was in itself the exercise of a 
right to figure in the European context”,150 by which Ruslana was “pushing her 
way into Europe while maintaining intact and authentic the culture with which she 
associated herself.”151 
 Both Sertab and Ruslana create narratives of Eurovision (and European) 
success whereby outsiders assert claims to cultural citizenship through careful 
negotiation of the binary of universality and difference; of the indigenous and the 
global. Both play with Orientalist tropes while also challenging and undermining 
them, and importantly, they deploy western fantasies of the female exotic object of 
desire while asserting their autonomy and freedom simultaneously. My argument 
is that these can be read as citizenship claims directed to a transnational audience 
which can be linked to political objectives of national membership and standing on 
the transnational stage of the European Union. Here Eurovision provides “the 
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chance to experience and experiment with more flexible identities – that respect 
the Other and ensures equal recognition and participation.”152 
 These songs also demonstrate the radically different ways in which the ESC is 
experienced across the transnational arena. For example, for “new” states of the 
former Soviet bloc or the former Yugoslavia, the ESC may provide a significant 
moment in which the nation can perform its aspirations. For some of these nation 
states, a western audience may have only a vague understanding of the country 
and its geographical and political location. Yet, for the three minutes of the ESC 
final, a peripherally constructed nation state is literally given centre stage. Not 
surprisingly, there are strong elements of national pride and longing which become 
evident, as the ESC becomes “an important preliminary exercise in ‘self-
imagining’ for the nation … and its mapping within both regional and global 
contexts.”153 Closely related here is the importance of hosting the Contest as a 
demonstration of national maturity (the “reward” for success the previous year), 
despite the significant financial implications involved for the host country.154 The 
ability of the nation’s broadcaster to take on the event can be read as signifying 
national entry on the international stage – a joining of the European “club” – no 
matter the economic sacrifices which may need to be made: “the production of the 
Eurovision Song Contest, the Olympic Games and other similar events is the final 
test that the nation has the capability to join in the symbolic commodity production 
of late, post-industrial modernity.”155 
 By contrast, for those partaking in Eurovision from the politically dominant 
centre, the attitude towards Eurovision is sometimes more ironic, and may even 
suggest a temporary refusal of power given over to the margins, safe in the 
knowledge that this abdication is fleeting.156 In less playful moments, however, the 
attitude may be one of outrage at the results. For example, Britain’s relationship to 
the ESC – characterized largely by abysmal failure in recent times – has given rise 
to what might be called “Eurovisionscepticism”, which permeates all aspects of 
the coverage of the event in the media.157 This discontent has led to calls for the 
UK to withdraw from the ESC (mirroring the calls of some to withdraw from the 
European Union) and within much popular commentary, the flaws of the two 
institutions are similarly described.158 The EU is seen as rife with corruption, 
notable for the failure of some countries to follow the law, financial waste, and 
nepotism, all of which comes at the expense of the UK. The ESC is met with 
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similar criticisms, much of it linked to the direct democracy of televoting, which 
undermines the objectivity of judgment based on artistic merit. Regional loyalties 
and diasporic communities are frequently blamed for the ills of the Contest.159 
There are numerous other ways by which this relationship of the national to the 
postnational is played out, including bold defiance, defeatism, or simply 
withdrawal through the refusal to participate.160 
 
IV. WHO SINGS FOR THE NATION?  
 
 To this point, I have argued that Eurovision is a popular cultural means by 
which individuals through nation states relate to a transnational community in a 
plethora of different ways. But the ESC creates a multifaceted web of citizenship 
identification. In this section, I want to shift my focus downwards to look within 
the nation state at how cultural citizenship can operate through Eurovision. This 
investigation reinforces the point that the ESC facilitates multiple ways by which 
viewers relate to the event, and this underscores the complexity of identity and 
difference within, as well as beyond, the nation state.161 Thus, I now want to “drill 
down” to see the tensions that exist within the nation state in the determination of 
how it will be represented internationally. This illustrates the struggles and 
“contestations for cultural narratives”162 that surround how the nation constitutes its 
citizens within the conditions of complex, multiple identities.163 
 Countries are largely free to choose their Eurovision entry by any means and 
there is considerable variation in practice.164 Many create some form of 
competition for the choice of song and/or performer. This provides a public sphere 
in which to contest how the nation defines and presents itself, and for citizens and 
groups within the polity to make claims for rights of participation. It frequently 
raises both good natured and fierce debate about who belongs to the nation state 
and how it should be represented internationally. Questions concerning the 
appropriateness and authenticity of national representation go hand in hand with 
the issue of artistic merit. In this way, Eurovision reproduces the relationship 
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between citizenship as unity and forms of multicultural citizenship based on 
difference, in which challenges are made to the belief that there can be any 
essential, authentic, indigenous form of citizen unmediated by a constellation of 
identities and allegiances.   
 There are numerous examples where competitors at the national level have 
challenged conventional norms by which the nation state constructs itself, and in 
doing so, they have often risked the wrath of public and elite opinion. In terms of 
performers, it is not surprising that race and ethnicity have been closely tied to 
what is considered authentic representation, and it has been argued in this regard 
that Eurovision historically has been characterized by its “whiteness.”165 But 
Eurovision is also significant in that it has created spaces whereby novel claims to 
citizenship through participation have been successful both at national level and in 
the ESC final itself. Thus, Eurovision has provided an opportunity to “open up” 
questions of citizenship in productive and interesting ways.166 Here again, we see 
how Eurovision acts as a literal stage for performing disputes over identity and 
belonging.167 Performance can serve to highlight that there is no primordial, 
essential national culture, instead flagging up the hybridity and cultural exchange 
that goes into the construction of nations and peoples.168 Performance can also 
serve a transformative function in rewriting the historical narrative, re-presenting 
the nation state to others in such a way as to defy stereotypes of a nation state as 
“other.” It can underscore the complex relationship of nation both to a claimed 
essence and to global cultural currents. In this way, the central tensions that exist 
within national communities around, for example, race, ethnicity, gender and 
sexuality, in terms of who gets to speak (or, more accurately, sing) for the nation 
state get enacted. 
 Yet again, there are close parallels between citizenship in the ESC and in the 
European Union. For example, it has been thoroughly documented (and endlessly 
demonstrated) that lesbians and (particularly) gay men make up a devoted 
Eurovision audience that crosses national boundaries.169 The ESC has even served 
as a fulcrum for the formation and manifestation of an international collective 
sexual identity by providing a point of identification that connects disparate gay 
communities. In this way, Eurovision can be understood as a longstanding practice 
of sexual citizenship, in that it has provided a site of community formation, self-
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validation, and identification with others.170 There is also some evidence of bloc 
voting on the basis of sexuality across national borders suggesting an affinity that 
transcends national diversity.171  
 Related to this point, Eurovision has witnessed – on innumerable occasions – 
forms of sex/gender transgression in performance which trouble the 
heteronormativity of the nation state.172 In these moments, claims to inclusion in 
the national imagination are made which simultaneously facilitate the articulation 
of collective sexual identities within the nation state and transnationally. These 
claims frequently have been subject to contestation and debate, and have 
sometimes led to sharp “backlash” discourses from those who argue that the nation 
state is being inappropriately and inauthentically represented. National pride and 
shame are frequently invoked tropes.173 
 In 2002, for example, the Slovenian entry (thanks to expert jury voting) was a 
drag act portraying three airline flight attendants.174 While a queer reading of this 
performance might focus upon the postmodern play of the signifiers of sexuality, 
nationhood and globalization, the reaction in Slovenia was far less amused, with 
widespread protests.175 Moreover, those protests were themselves “cited as 
evidence that Slovenia was not a suitable candidate for entry into the EU, which it 
hoped to join in 2004.”176 The reaction outside of Slovenia underscored the EU’s 
own ideological underpinnings in relation to those countries seeking accession. 
That move underscores Europe’s continuing civilizing discourse, which has been 
most apparent in the context of accession states and the demands of EU 
institutions for national legal recognition of lesbian and gay rights.177   
 By contrast, the famous victory of Israeli transsexual Dana International in 
ESC 1998 was widely (but certainly not universally) interpreted in Israel in 
positive terms as a triumph of liberalism.178 Ivan Raykoff argues that “Dana 
International’s victory represented geographically peripheral Israel as 
‘international’ too, and served to rally liberal West European values towards the 
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image of a secular and progressive nation.”179 It also served as an important tool 
for community formation by gay men in Israel who, it has been argued, felt part of 
a wider transnational queer community as a result.180 At the time, the performance 
was described as blending “popular, representative Israeli music with resistance to 
ordinary nationalist representation.”181 
 More recently, the Eurovision contest in Moscow in 2009 served as the site for 
a gay pride march which led to violence and police brutality, as the state 
responded to demands made in the language of universal human rights.182 The ESC 
acted as a lynchpin for a clash over political inclusion, acceptance and rights.183 In 
this moment, claims are denied through the direct violence of the state. These 
examples illustrate how the ESC inevitably raises the central citizenship question 
of who is entitled to speak (or sing) for the nation state – who is allowed in the 
public sphere of Eurovision – and which narrative of national identity is allowed to 
dominate (as well as the relationship between minority voices and the democratic 
majority, who have a central role to play in determining success).184 
 
V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
 
“Europe”: an unfilled signifier, an almost-empty term capable of 
endless mutations and transformations, an open and elusive term 
of great/little significance and power … [T]he idea of Europe 
has become a liminal concept, fluid and indeterminate, and most 
importantly, a site of political struggle.185 
 
In this article, I have illustrated the complexities of citizenship and belonging 
through the example of the Eurovision Song Contest. I have argued that the ESC 
underscores the contested character of the nation state and the transnational entity 
that is “Europe”, in which claims of belonging are articulated and resisted, and 
visions of the community are contested. At the transnational level, I have argued 
that European citizenship clearly illustrates how the EU itself is lacking an essence 
and is better characterized as a union of peoples that is constructed, multiple, and 
shifting. In those moments in which identity is articulated, it is inherently 
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exclusionary and divisive. While one might assume that “artistic merit” is the 
essential unifying feature of the ESC, even an occasional viewer of the Contest 
will find that merit is itself a negotiable concept, and this is brought within sharp 
relief in the Contest.186 My analysis advocates the rejection of a European ideology 
of cultural grand narratives across what may better be described as “a community 
of strangers.”187  
 In this reading, the challenge – but also the potential – of “Europe” is for it to 
be revealed as an empty vessel of interpretive possibilities. This explains why the 
construction of anything described as a European Constitution may be doomed to 
fail, given that there is no shared historical narrative and no agreed telos.188 We 
find instead a series of competing and sometimes contradictory narratives. 
Moreover, like Eurovision, the EU may display an ostensible commitment to 
equality between peoples (and human rights), but this can hide the extent to which 
this is a neoliberal equality which masks substantive economic inequalities 
between margins and centre.189 The underlying thread that has woven the European 
Union together has been the market – the explicit basis for the EEC in the first 
place – and the form of citizenship which has accompanied it has been market 
citizenship characterized by the free movement of workers.190 But the inadequacies 
of market citizenship have also been thoroughly documented, including that it 
creates a passive form of citizenship far removed from the republican traditions 
advocated by citizenship supporters.191 Eurovision, by contrast, does facilitate an 
active form of citizenship and it thereby opens up creative space by which claims 
to inclusion can be made by individuals, groups and nation states.192 It also 
underscores the complexities of multiple allegiances, the role of diasporic 
communities in citizenship, and gives rise to affinities and coalitions that cross 
borders. This is a citizenship that can both reify and denaturalize boundaries 
simultaneously. At its best, this form of “citizenship can be used in order to 
rethink the past, to transform the present and to open up new socio-political 
practices that can best realize the promise of equal participation in the polity.”193  
  But I conclude by recognizing that the ESC cannot be separated from the 
disciplinary forces of citizenship. It is increasingly subject to “slick” production 
values, the commercialized international promotion of songs prior to the 
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competition, the ultimate goal of securing lucrative recording contracts and, 
perhaps most importantly, major costs to produce songs and host a highly 
commercial competition, as well as “the commodification of Otherness.”194 We 
might therefore ask whether we are left with a form of citizenship that is 
increasingly disciplined and normalized. Although this point suggests a 
pessimistic conclusion regarding Eurovision as a space for the rearticulation of 
citizenship, a balanced assessment is demanded. That is, my view is that the ESC 
both disciplines and normalizes into a form of citizenship, but also leaves 
openings through which discipline can be circumvented. The parallel here may be 
to the ways in which the EU, which no doubt disciplines the citizen into the 
market, also creates spaces for moments of solidarity (such as transnational 
organizing around human rights) which challenge the centrality of market 
citizenship. The ESC, by analogy, opens spaces for camaraderie, coalition, affinity 
and transgression which trouble the neoliberal logic of formally equal, but 
substantively unequal citizens, and which do not rely upon narratives of cultural 
sameness.
195
 This may be the wider lesson of the complexities of citizenship 
discourse – that it is a technology which is never total and in which the 
opportunities for transformation are never finally closed. 
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